

HOLLAND'S PLANS FOR THE FUTURE--AND DENMARK'S

Holland Desires Peace for Its Own Sake, and No Offer of Gain from Either Side Will Bribe Her Into War, Asserts a Noted Hollander.

By Professor A. A. H. Struycken

Member of Queen Wilhelmina's Private Council, Professor of Constitutional and International Law at the University of Amsterdam, Editor of "Van Ouden Tijd" and Author of "The War and International Law," "The Constitution of the Netherlands: Its Character and Value," "English State Documents," etc.

THE psychology of the human mind is a difficult study; the psychology of nations presents a variety of problems still more complicated; the psychology of foreign nations, by the very differences in the minds involved, touches an extreme of baffling complexity. This should be borne in mind when an author belonging to a people engaged in the present war speaks of or to neutral nations, giving his opinion as to what these nations will either do or not do in this war. Only too easily will he attribute to them the character, the feelings, the aspirations of his own country.

How completely the Germans deceived themselves when at the beginning of the war they, especially the scholars among them, deluged Holland with a flood of pamphlets, evidently believing that the Dutch, like themselves, had firmly resolved to call everything that Germany had done and would do right and just and humane! When, on the other hand, the French or English utter the expectation, either as a bitter reproach or as an earnest, well-meant exhortation, that Holland will soon join the Allies, how little knowledge of the real popular feeling in Holland do they betray!

"We English know something of the Dutch spirit," says H. G. Wells in his article on "Holland's Future," and then he expresses this very expectation—Holland is to be fighting with the Allies before many months have passed by. But his words do not contain the proof. If Mr. Wells thinks he has correctly interpreted the popular feeling in Holland, he is mistaken. His article breathes an English, not a Dutch spirit.

What, then, is the Dutch feeling? I shall attempt to explain it in discussing the reasons why, according to Mr. Wells, Holland should take part in the war, and in doing so I shall lay aside my own opinions and depict only the feelings of my people, without adding praise or blame.


Holland, so Mr. Wells thinks, will side with the Allies, first, from loathing of and indignation at the wrong done to Belgium. Indeed, in the first days of August others expressed this same view. Holland was to side with the Belgian people, to whom she is so closely related, since, without any fault of their own, they were to be crushed and annihilated by their powerful neighbor. Holland's own interests, too, required her to come to the rescue and to prevent the principle of the independence of the smaller states from being ruthlessly trodden under foot. In this way some spoke in public, in this way many talked at home. Was it the general feeling of the Dutch people? Evidently not. These utterances were soon hushed. The poor, brave Belgians were pitied for the sufferings they had undeservedly to endure; they were charitably received and supported when helpless they came to our country in great numbers; but for the rest we then passively watched the course of events. And should we now choose the side of the Allies for the wrong done to Belgium? Such a thing is done at once or it is never done at all.

"Holland holds a sword at the back of Germany," it can "deliver a conclusive blow," "finish Germany." You have only, Mr. Wells suggests, "to look at the map" to see that. If Holland does not intervene, the war will last for another full year. Holland remains oppressed by the expensive mobilization of her army, by the stagnation of her trade and industry, by the support of the Belgian refugees. For Mr. Wells these are further reasons why Holland should make war on Germany.

But the Dutch do not consider ourselves such good strategists that, like Mr. Wells, we venture by a single "look at the map" to judge the value of our military position in this war.

We know very well that in spite of our limited forces we would be an ally not to be despised, but we also know that war making is a gamble and that the chance of our shortening the war by intervening does not counterbalance the misery that war will surely bring in its train.

For our country's future, for that, at any rate, we ought to go to war. What is in store for us? The Allies will no doubt win. France and Belgium will expand their territories as far as the Rhine, and, closely allied, they will be our powerful neighbors to the south. In the north, Germany will have to be cut off from the North Sea; she will have to do without East Friesland and the Frisian Islands. Is not Holland, then, the very country for obtaining this territory? At the same time Holland's frontier near the Rhine could be rounded off.



Professor A. A. H. Struycken.

T. Lothrop Stoddard.

Why Denmark Counts

Mr. Stoddard States the Case for Another of the Pygmy Nations Which Is Bitter Against Both England and Germany for the Harm They Have Done Her.

By T. Lothrop Stoddard

AT FIRST sight it might appear as though Denmark's attitude and possible course of action with reference to the European war were matters of very minor concern. This tiny country, with an area less than one-third that of the State of New York and a population numbering only 2,800,000, appears small, indeed, beside the titanic empires now locked in a death grapple for world dominion. Nevertheless, precisely because Europe's titans are thus deadlocked, its pygmies have acquired a political and military importance unknown in normal times. If the scales be only weighted evenly enough a feather may send the balance one way or the other. Thus a quite minor power may conceivably play an exceedingly important role in the course of events, especially if such a power be situated at a strategically vital point.

Now, this is just the case with Denmark. Lying, as it does, between the European mainland and the Scandinavian Peninsula, the guns of its capital, Copenhagen, command the passage from the North Sea to the Baltic, while its land frontier stretches perilously close to Germany's naval lifeline, the Kiel Canal. Its people are as prosperous and virile as any in the world, its wealth proportionately considerable, and in the last analysis it could put into line some 200,000 men who, unless Danish military history be at fault, would prove themselves most excellent soldiers. Thus we see that such questions as how Denmark feels toward the war and what she purposes to do are by no means idle queries.

First of all, then, how does Denmark feel about the war? The answer is that most Danes want with all their hearts to keep out of it, and that they have no desire to see their trim, prosperous little land turned into a cockpit of war. "The Danish people," writes the eminent Danish scholar, L. V. Birck, of the University of Copenhagen, "sincerely desires to remain neutral, and this desire, founded on a very strong wish for peace, has certainly not been weakened by the course of events."

However, just because a people may have no abstract desire to enter a war is no proof that the developments of the struggle may not impel them to give their sympathies to one or other of the contending parties and ultimately to drift into the war by force of circumstances. It, therefore, becomes important to know how Danish public opinion regards the combatants in the present conflict. This in practice means how Danes regard England and Germany, the only two great powers with whom Denmark stands in close relationship. The answer to

this query appears to be that Denmark has politically a distinct aversion to both her great neighbors, but that this political antipathy is largely counteracted by those conciliating factors, cultural intercourse and intimate economic relations.

REMEMBER AGGRESSION.

Had Denmark neither intellectual nor economic commerce with England and Germany her attitude toward them would to-day probably be a rather vengeful "a plague on both your houses," for the saddest pages in modern Danish history are due to British and German aggression. During the last great European catastrophe, the Napoleonic wars, England punished Denmark's refusal to abandon her neutrality and enter the struggle on Britain's side by twice bombarding Copenhagen, destroying the whole Danish fleet and carrying off everything worth taking. As for the Teutons, just fifty years ago Prussia, acting as the executor of the will of the German people, made war on Denmark, and after several bloody battles forced the exhausted little nation to cede the prize aimed at, the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. By the Danish people neither of these aggressions has been either forgotten or forgiven, as is well shown by Danish utterances during the European crises of the last decade and during the present war. At the time of the great crisis of 1905, when England and Germany alike put pressure on Denmark by sending battle fleets to pay "friendly" calls at Copenhagen, Denmark's leading newspaper, the "Politiken," replied to these threats in the following impartial vein: "We shall receive both fleets courteously, and with no illusions. England has bombarded Copenhagen. Germany has dismembered our territory. We know that both things may happen again." That these sentiments are equally strong to-day is shown by the words of Professor Birck: "The political sentiments of the Danes are marked by a deep bitterness toward the great powers as such: history teaches us to expect nothing good from those quarters; we know that toward us they will adopt whatever attitude may be dictated by their ambitions and their selfish appetites."

Fortunately for the world's peace, however, the rancors of old wrongs are usually softened by such mollifying factors as intellectual intercourse and economic exchange, which lead peoples to judge their neighbors by the light of present sympathies as well as by past prejudices. The importance of cultural ties in the formation of national public opinion is strikingly exemplified in the case of Denmark. For over a generation the relations between Danish

and German intellectual and artistic life have been growing more and more intimate. Danish scholars, litterateurs and artists have met with warm sympathy and appreciation at the hands of the German public, while German art and thought have in their turn exerted a profound reflex influence on Danish cultural life.

GEORG BRANDEN.

Accordingly, it is not surprising to find that in the present war a majority of the Danish "intellectuals" are pro-German. Notable among these for the strength of their convictions are Johannes Jensen and the novelist Karl Larsen. Highly instructive is the attitude of Georg Branden, the best known Danish figure to the English speaking world. At the time of the European crisis of 1905, Branden advised an English alliance in case of a European war. To-day he is far from holding the same sentiments, if we may judge from his famous break with Monsieur Clemenceau. That eminent French politician and publicist had long entertained an intellectual intimacy with Branden. Noticing that his Danish friend avoided political topics in his letters since the outbreak of the war, Clemenceau urged him to unboomer himself on these subjects, asking specifically for Branden's opinion as to the charges of German atrocities and as to whether Denmark would take Schleswig if Germany were defeated. To these questions Branden answered that at such a moment he preferred to reserve judgment on all charges and that as to the Danish speaking portions of Schleswig, Denmark would not take them from a crushed and humiliated Germany, but only as the free gift of Germany. Whereupon Monsieur Clemenceau angrily broke off the friendship in his widely noted open letter, "Farewell, Branden," and further stigmatized the Danes as a "prideless people."

PRUSSIAN POLICY IN SCHLESWIG.

That there is to-day a majority of Danish writers who are strongly anti-German seems principally due to the blunders of the Prussian government in its treatment of the Danish speaking population of Schleswig. The vast majority of the inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein are German in language and in blood. Out of some 1,700,000 souls only about 150,000 are Danish speaking, and these are compactly massed in the districts just south of the present Danish frontier. That this small handful of peasants could present the slightest political or cultural danger to the overwhelming German majority is unthinkable, yet the Prussian government has attempted to Germanize the Schleswig Danes with as much thoroughness as it has the Poles of Posen or the Franco-

philes of Alsace-Lorraine. The result of this stupid and senseless policy is that the memory of the war with Prussia has been kept alive in many Danish hearts, and that to-day there is a small but aggressive group (the so-called "Nationalists") who advocate joining the Allies and striking for Schleswig again. But for Prussian tactlessness there certainly would be no such party, as is best proved by the fact that the two classes which one would normally expect to find in the "Nationalist" ranks (the aristocracy and the army) appear to be more pro than anti German. Social relations between the German and Danish aristocracies are very close, and frequent intermarriages have made many great families like the Buelows, the Wedels and the Moltkes truly Dano-German. It is interesting to remember that the great Moltke of 1870 fame began his career as an officer in the Danish army. Also it should not be forgotten that the royal family is itself of German origin. As for the army, its professional spirit is nurtured exclusively on German sources. The Danish officer who fought the Prussians half a century ago was trained along French lines, but here, as in so many other fields, Denmark has fallen within the German orbit, and the Danish officer of to-day takes his professional outlook from Berlin.

The profound influence of Germany on Danish cultural life is nowhere more manifest than in the attitude of Denmark's "advanced" elements toward the war. For the last decade Denmark has been going through a very rapid political and social transformation which has written some exceedingly radical measures upon her statute books and which has given the ballot to women by the recent universal suffrage amendment to the Danish constitution. One might say offhand that this would denote the sympathies of Danish radicals being for England and her present radical administration rather than for Germany with her more conservative regime. As a matter of fact, however, it does not work out that way. The Danish radicals and socialists have always been in the closest touch with the corresponding German circles, and German rather than English goals of political and social evolution seem to be their ideal. The present Danish government is strongly radical-socialist (those parties having a strong majority in the Danish parliament), and its attitude has certainly shown no signs of being either pro-British or anti-German.

We thus see that cultural intercourse has tended to draw Denmark far more toward Germany than toward England. As to the

Continued on fifth page.

Not Friendless, as H. G. Wells Declares, She Will Keep Her Head in Spite of Oppressive Incidents Arising from Acrimonious Conduct of the War.

With Germany defeated and weakened, a powerful Triple Alliance, consisting of France, Belgium and Holland, could secure peace for good and all. But Holland would get more; England, France and Belgium would guarantee the possession of her colonies should an Asiatic power at any time view them with a longing eye.

Thus, "clearly and attractively," Mr. Wells pictures to us "the prize of alliance."

What awaits us if we remain neutral? We will continue what we are, but lonely and friendless. Germany will not be our friend, since we have not shown sufficient enthusiasm for the Teutonic brotherhood. Unless Holland extends assistance to the Allies Germany will not be completely defeated, but still she will be defeated to such an extent that France

and Belgium will obtain their aggrandizement of territory. There will ensue a temporary calm, which Germany will make use of to renew her strength. When she thinks the time has come for her to take vengeance on her arch enemy, England, she will not request "innocent passage" for her submarines and aeroplanes from our stronger southern neighbors, but from us. And, besides, if an Asiatic power makes a grab at our colonies we shall stand alone. According to Mr. Wells.

A decision for Holland seems easy, and yet a few people hesitate. But a great majority of the people do not; therefore Holland remains neutral. To be sure, many a Dutchman anxiously asks himself by what means in the future our national existence and the permanent possession of our colonies is to be secured. For more than a century tradition has kept Holland out of the great international politics, and, in the opinion of her people, she has had no reason to regret it. Nor has the present war given them cause to renounce this tradition.

We know that the possibilities Mr. Wells depicts may be realized, but there may be imagined other possibilities which would justify a course of action different from the one he recommends. Holland abstains from all calculation of chances of this kind, keeps out of international politics and remains what she is—a peaceful, neutral nation that sometimes dreams of playing in the future a leading part in the development of international law, but does not wish to take part in the struggle for power in the community of nations.

For gain we will indeed not make war, Mr. Wells thinks that thousands of Dutchmen will contemplate with pleasure and approval the rounded-off frontiers of their territory, as traced by him on the map. How grievously he is mistaken! We Dutch not only wish for no "aggrandizement for the sake of aggrandizement" but we wish for no aggrandizement at all, for any reason whatever. As regards our territory, we are, small as it may be, "un peuple satisfait."

Perhaps the English cannot understand such a popular feeling; that it exists, they must believe my statement. Perhaps they think our satisfaction with our present position a sign of inferiority, just as many a German considered it a sign of inferiority that we did not embrace with enthusiasm the German cause. Such criticism, however, is unable to induce the Dutch people to change their course of action.

For a year now the war has continued, and the time has been long enough to show Holland what it wishes. She wants only to maintain peace. She will not go to war unless compelled to do so. Mr. Wells thinks that such a situation will not arise, since Holland's position is materially strong as regards Germany and morally strong as regards the Allies. This is also the opinion of many people in Holland. They think that for Germany a neutral Holland, guarding its western front, is to be preferred to a hostile Holland, is indeed of more worth perhaps than an allied Holland, open to an invasion of the Allies, would be, and they also believe that England, which took up arms to defend Belgium's integrity, will never disgrace herself by violating Holland's neutrality, which, besides, is also of great importance to the Allies.

Holland will maintain peace as long as Holland herself is not menaced. Incidents that arise from the acrimonious way in which the war is conducted will not induce her to take part in it, however oppressive they may sometimes be to her interests, unless such incidents should be proofs of malevolent intentions toward her. Then, indeed, it will not be Holland, but one of the belligerents that involves the Dutch in the war. We are reckoning with such a possibility, and for that reason our army is kept mobilized permanently.

Holland desires peace for the sake of peace itself. Perhaps the belligerents cannot easily appreciate this attitude, because they sacrifice so much in the struggle for what they deem their right and their duty. We Dutch only hope that the time will soon come when the belligerents, too, will appreciate the fact that on this little strip of land, in the midst of the atrocities of the war, the banner of peace has continued waving, and we are confident that when peace is restored Holland will not be so lonely and friendless as Mr. Wells would make us believe. The future alone can show whether we are mistaken.

The Case for Holland

"For gain we will indeed not make war. We Dutch not only wish for no 'aggrandizement for the sake of aggrandizement,' but we wish for no aggrandizement for any reason whatever."

"As for our territory, we are small as it may be, 'un peuple satisfait.' Perhaps the English cannot understand such a popular feeling."

"Incidents that arise from the acrimonious way in which the war is conducted will not induce Holland to take part in it, however oppressive they may sometimes be to her interests."

"... it will not be Holland, but one of the belligerents that involves the Dutch in the war."

"Holland desires peace for the sake of peace itself. Perhaps the belligerents cannot easily appreciate this attitude."



Denmark will walk softly, but well armed—(King Christian X on the horse with white nose in the foreground.)

The Case for Denmark

"The Danish people will not display those jackal instincts needed to permit it to throw itself at the last moment upon the dying lion."

"Our intentions? Our future conduct? One word will suffice; we want peace."

"History teaches us to expect nothing good from those quarters (the great powers)."

"We know that toward us they will adopt whatever attitude may be dictated by their ambitions and their selfish appetites."

"Europe's pygmies have acquired a political and military importance unknown in normal times."